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The idea that the government rarely tells the whole truth, and usually only communicates 
with the general public through propaganda, is not a new one. However, the idea that they now 
do so using specific terms that call into question the truthfulness of anything and everything is a 
more modem idea. "Framing" is one of the terms used to describe this new type of propaganda, 
and it is active in all aspects of communication, from the mainstream media to the White House, 
and everywhere in between. People use frames when they tell stories to each other, newspapers 
use frames when they decide what words to use as a headline, and governments use frames when 
they issue press releases and statements. This is not necessarily a bad thing when taken by itself, 
but in a culture of altered truth, is it even possible to find what really is happening, to know for 
sure what the "real truth" is? 
While that question is not one that I can answer, I will try in the pages of this thesis to 
frame how this problem was created and what steps it took to go from obvious propaganda to 
more insidious, subconscious perspective-shifting. Two of the best illustrations for this are the 
White House and the mainstream media, as media frames are used by both entities to shape their 
meanings and in both cases the words chosen to craft the images and messages they send out 
cause the truth to be hidden in a sort of bodyguard of lies. This is most clearly seen in cases of 
war, when the lines between ethical and unethical are already blurred, which lead Sir Winston 
Churchill to remark once that "in wartime, truth is so precious she must always be attended to by 
a bodyguard of lies." 
To understand what is happening to the truth, more so in the current global climate of 
constant conflicts and turmoil, the concepts of "frame" and "media frame" need to be more 
clearly explained. Pippa Norris, in Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government, and 
the Public, states that the "idea of'ncws frames' refers to interpretive structures thatjoumalists 
usc to set particular events within their broader contcxt."1 Therefore, a frame is a word or phrase 
used to set parameters around the word, top1c, idea, or activity 1t IS explaming.2 A rned1a or news 
frame is a frame that is used in the media. Think of 1t as a sneaky euphemism, or a ·word that 
sounds normal , but has subtly shifted a person's thinkmg ever-so-slightly before they even hear 
the topic, makmg it d1fficult for them to get an entire, accurate picture of what they are being 
told. A news frame may also be defined as the "selection to priontize some facts, images, or 
developments over others, thereby unconsciously promoting one particular mterpretation of 
events."3 
Norns explams a news frame's purpose as: 
"bundling key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain 
common ways of mtcrpreting developments. The essence of framing 1s select1on 
to prioritize some facts, images, or developments over others, therebj' conscious 
or unconsciously promoting one particular interpretation of events." 
For example, in a post-9/ II world, "terrorism" is understood as "the systematic use of coercive 
intimidation against c1vtlians for poht1cal goals."5 Norris contmues to explam that that 
understanding can be broken down mto smaller p1eces, sub-labeled techmques (how we 
understand 'coercive mtimidation' to be carried out), targets (what we believe 'civtl ian 
population' to mean in a given terrorist situation), and goals (what we understand them to be 
after, in this case, political gam/s). Once these are understood, the frame is further broken down 
into state versus group terrorism. State terronsm occurs when a government is using terroristic 
1 I\ oms, ct at. I 0 
' Norris, et at. 4. 6 ..... the 1dea of news frames, representing persistent patterns of selection, cmphas1s, and 
exclusion that furnish a coherent mterprctat1on and evaluation of events "Norri'l contmuco; the explanation on pg. 6. 
"(th1s) conccptuahzallon is intimately linked with theory. there can be no '>mglc 'correct ' dcflnllJOn, mstcad 
concepts should be asse-.-.cd in terms of the fruitfulness of the theoretical insight-. that flO\\ from the understanding." 
3 orns, et at.. I I 
1 Norris, et al., I 0-11 . 
~Norris, et at , 6 "This concept identifies tillS phenomenon by the techniques. targets, and goals, and all these 
attnbutes arc regarded as necessary and sufficient for an act to quahfy as terrorism. "Terrons/s .. arc those \vho 
employ the methods of tcrromm." 
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acts agamst its own people, and non-state terrorism is that type practtced by jthadist factions, 
radtcal msurgents, mmority d1ssidents and other such non-state actors.6 Wtthout even realizmg 1t, 
the human brain uses what it already knows to fit the Situation 1t is presented with into familiar 
terms. These familiar terms are often the ones used in media, which allows perceptiOns to be 
manipulated without their owner even noticing what has happened many times. While a frame 1s 
often an implicit reference, propaganda tends to be much more blatant. Propaganda is defined by 
the Oxford english Dictionary as "the systematic dissemination of informatiOn, esp. tn a biased 
or m1sleading way, in order to promote a polttical cause or point of view. Also: information 
disseminated in this way; the means or media by which such ideas arc disseminated."1 
Before diving into the world of modem med1a frames, 1t is necessary to go backward in 
t1me to explore and explain the stages of their development, and how they evolved from clearly 
obv1ous propaganda to what they arc today. Throughout history, governments have engaged in 
the usc of propaganda and carefully crafted messages to "inform" their people. Th1s is most 
blatantly seen in cases of war or leading up to a war. During wars the normal slant of a 
government's message tends to become even more b1ased. A government uses both propaganda 
and spcc1fic frames to influence a population's view on the conflict. One example of early 
propaganda 1s the use of the idea of the United States as a "ltberator" nation to the people of the 
Phtlippine Islands during the 1890s. The Ftlipinos were portrayed as "heathens" and savages, the 
United States was portrayed as the opposite a democratiC, Christian country. 11 Propaganda 
d1ffers from a frame or media news frame in that it 1s blatantly obv1ous, the aud1ence realizes 
that it is a crafted message (though in countnes such as China, it has a brainwashing type effect 
on them), and it usually ongmates from the government. A frame is not always as easily seen, 
~ f'..orris, ct al., 7-9 
"propaganda, n" 3"' dcfimtion OLD Onhnc. No\cmber 2010. Oxford l nl\crsity Press 
Brewer. 19-21 
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and may be government-created or crafted by a spec1al interest group, or media outlet. The point 
is, 1t is normally poss1ble to tell when propaganda IS used by the Umted States Government, and 
it is not always poss1ble to tell when a specific frame is being used. 
A good example of a modern frame is President George W. Bush's usc of the phrase 
"ax1s of evil" to represent the countnes opposed to American values. Bush did not have to say 
them by name, he used a phrase and Americans (and the rest of the world) kne\.\ who he was 
referring to (North Korea, Iran, Iraq etc ... ). This IS arguably because of the frames used in 
mentioning these countries prior to that speech.9 If a country is referred to as "evil," when an 
"ax1s of evtl" IS mentioned, the publtc subconsciously places that country mto 1t; however, "ax1s 
of evil" is also propaganda. The line between these two concepts often overlaps, as they are, at 
the core, the same thing. 
1 Kellner. 46-47. 
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cction 1: llistory and growth of propaganda 
\ Vorld \Var I 
World War I is considered to be the birth of modem day war propaganda. Due to the 
brutality and length of the Great War, a it was often called, a totally new type of propaganda 
was needed to keep up morale and publtc opinion; th1s was created using a barrage of messages 
phrased to persuade the public in a number of ways. "The cogn1tive, lingu1stic, and v1sual 
devices that fueled the war were recognized as a qualitative leap into effective mass 
persuasion."10 Propaganda worked primarily, according to Andersen, by feeding the public's 
hatred, fear, and most Importantly, tmagination. 11 The power of propaganda was analyzed by 
many scholars and political scientists benveen the World Wars as its power over the people was 
frightening. 12 Another facet of the rirst World War was the mas media. It was the tirc;t war in 
which newspapers and telegraphs could get the information out to many people in a relatively 
short amount of time. Woodrow Wtlson established the Comm1ttee of Public Information (CPI) 
and headed it up with George Creel. Creel was a well-known, wealthy media mogul , who knew 
the ins and outs of crafting a message. His leadership of the CPI caused it to often be referred to 
as the 'Creel Committee." President Wtlson 's decisiOn to hire Creel shows that he understood the 
need to tie media frame and government propaganda together as Creel wa a new paper editor 
and was familtar w1th framing. 13 Another propaganda tactic U!>ed during World War I wa that of 
the "new \VOrld" (i.e. the United States) commg to the rescue of the "old world" (i.e. Lurope). 
Po ters and rhetonc used by polit1c1ans supported thl ':i 1dea and made World War I a "Crusade 
10 Andersen, 4-) 
11 In I Centun of Medw. I Ccntun of Ww , \nder~en explore~ thts 1dea over the past century of America's 
m\oh·ement m war and conn1ct, and ho'' propaganda was used and evolved . 
1
' Andersen, 7 
\ndcrscn, 6-S. 
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for Democracy." 14 A University of IllinOIS Urbana-Champa1gn study showed that in World War 
I, more inclusive language (1.e. "us v. them" or "Christ1an over barbanans," "God on our side" 
etc . . ) was used when describing the war than in any war before it or after it. However, their 
study also showed (in post-hoc contrasts) that there was as much "our side" rhetoric used in the 
Iraq war, albeit in different forms.'~ 
\Vorld \Var II 
In contrast to the inclusive rhetoric used in World War I propaganda, the strategy 
employed m World War II (the Good War) was that of the politics of fear. Th1s was the 1dea that 
if the Allies did not\\ in, a terrible thmg \\Ould overcome the world not to mention the end of 
the American way of life." 16 The Office of War Information (OWl) was used to replace World 
War I's CPl. Those in charge hoped to avoid the mistakes of their predeces ors, and to restore 
the public 's fa1th in official propaganda. To accomplish this goal, when the OWl opened in 1942 
they adopted a "strategy of truth" that was ba ed on the idea (hope) that an mformed public 
could make up its own mind.17 The OWl had overseas and domestic bureaus and their 
information focused specifically on distribution of its messages through the mass med1a. They 
promised to avoid using the "over the top" refrains used by the CPJ and instead to "instruct the 
public in a straightforward and practical way."1l! While themes ages purported to be these 
things, the reality was that they were !anted completely toward what the White House had 
1 ~ Brewer, 84-!16 
15 Althaus ct al • 16-17. " . the d1ffcrencc between war~ arc statisllcall)' Significant. but post-hoc contrasts clarify 
that th1s rcla11onsh1p 1s dnvcn b)' the prevalence of inclu~1ve language dunng World \\ ar I agamstthc more sedate 
coverage m \\ orld \\ ar II. Korea. and V1etnam Although both world ''ars arc remembered for their degree of 
patnot1c fen or, this analys1s reveals that World War I is the only standout Po'>t-hoc contrasts also reveal the 
surpnsmg finding that there was just as much "our s1de" m coverage of Iraq as m \\ orld War 1." 
~ Andersen, 20. 
I' Brewer, 88-89. 
IX Bre,vcr. 87. 
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dectded the policy needed to be. World War II propaganda mixed hard facts with uplifting and 
inspmng messages that tied mto supporttve cultural behefs. Thts caused the lines between what 
was real, and what people wanted to be real, to blur, resulting in people believing things that 
"1 19 were not necessan y true. 
Korea 
After World War II the United States government next used propaganda in Korea from 
1950- 1953. During the Korean War, the United States was a part of the United Nations coalition 
and helped South Korea fight the North Koreans and Communist China. The main addttion to the 
propaganda arsenal held by the government during this confltct was the televtston. While the 
1950s were early years for mass production ofTVs, their wide-spread popularity meant that 
Amcncans could now see their leaders telling them which way to think, and informing them on 
current events and happemngs in Korea.20 This made pre tdents and other officials more 
personable and easier to relate to (or built rapport with). The problem with television \\aS that the 
networks were slow in the changeover from two-dimensional to actual footage. Because of thts, 
they relied heavily on the U.S. Army Signal Corps and newsreel companies for their main 
footage. Hollywood film producers were recruited by these companies and gtven access to the 
informatiOn to be pre ented. However, it showed only what Amencans wanted to see of the 
conflict (and what the United State government would allow of tt).21 It ts notable that during 
World War I, World War II , and the Korean War the government imposed strict censorship on 
the media. This was especially evident in the hmited amount of negative news coverage allowed 
l'l Brewer explains these images. and ho'' they were inten..-oven into the fabric of American li,·es in chapter 3. 
spcctftcally on page~ 98-136. 
2
'. Andersen. ~6 
21 Andersen. 17 
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from the actual battlefields. 22 The censorshtp was so heavy that very little concrete information 
made it out ofthe country. General MacArthur's troops were the sole method of transportation 
for frontline reporters so that what was written was edited by central command prior to being 
transmitted back home. 
Whtle all of this was going on the media was being shaped by the antt-commumst frame. 
Edward R. Murrow, a CBS broadcaster made famous (or infamous) by hts 1952 broadcast 
"Christmas in Korea," said in an interview with his biographer, Ann Sperber, "lt was simply up 
to us to learn the language, the better to win friends and keep the Ru sians from dominating 
them."23 Whtle Murrow would go on to change hts vtews toward the end of the war, he was sttll 
bound by hts network to u e the frames that the government was allowing them to report on it.24 
Korea is often referred to as the "forgotten war," due in part to the strict censorship, and given 
the end result, it ts no surprise that the government wanted the war swept under the rug as swiftly 
as possible. HO\\ ever, the contrast provtded between Korea and the followmg conflict, Vietnam, 
was made all the more apparent by tts absence from the memory of the American people. 
Vietnam 
Vtetnam was the fir t uncensored coverage of a war in American history. Never before 
had media been allowed such free reign in reporting over a confltct, and the images that came out 
of the country were often graphic and bloody. The U.S. had been mvolved in the Vietnam 
conflict since 1956, but for many Americans the horrors of"Nam" started with the surpnse 
2
' <\ lthaus. et a1 , 11-14 Details the method used to collect the infom1at1on used in their study, and explams the 
factors used tn the ana} l<,1s 
2 Andersen, 3~-39 Details 'v1urro\\ 's story, and uti1itcs quotes from V1urrow's biographical inten.1ews with 
penccr 
24 \ndcrsen. 40. 
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attack on every major c1ty in South Vietnam by North Vietnamese troops in January of 1968 ~~ 
Th1s came to be known as the Tet Offens1ve. Becau e the fighting erupted ltterally in the streets, 
without warning, journalists were able to look out of their hotel windows and see the conflict 
going on around them?6 With satellite technology, it was possible for near-live images and 
video, leavmg little t1me for editing.~"' A prime example of the switch from censored to 
uncensored \\as the shO\\tng of the executiOn of a Vietcong officer by a South V1etnamese 
general. While the end of the tape was edited for television, NBC's producer at the time, Robert 
J. Northfield, described it as "the strongest stuff American viewers had ever seen. "211 Many 
scholars have argued that 1t was images such as these that lost the Vietnam War, that the media, 
not the military, were to blame for the lack of a victory there. It was not so much these images tn 
and of themselves, but rather the people's sudden realization that the military and the 
government had been lying about the actions taking place in war.29 CBS evenmg news anchor 
Walter Cronk1te tra\ eled to Vietnam shortly after the start of the Tet Offensive and gave several 
reports from the country. Shortly after he returned to the United States, Cronkite presented his 
"editorial opinion" at the end of the nightly news broadcast on February 27, 1968 (an 
unprecedented step for an anchor). Cronk1te said, "For it seems now more certain than ever that 
the bloody experience ofV1etnam IS to end in a stalemate."30 Brewer points out that the 
transition m1d-conflict from Kennedy who was a well-liked, respected president, to Johnson a 
25 Andersen, 41:1. 
't 
• Andersen, 48-49. "Journalists not incapacitated from fear or depress1on could step out of the1r hotel rooms and 
mto the m1dc,t of confl1ct. The \Var had come to them Photographers captured images of battles bemg fought m the 
streets of Sa1gon, mcluding wounded US '>Oid•er-;, and telev•s•on brought those images mto Amencan li,·ing rooms 
dunng dinnenune " 
'
7 \ndersen, 49 Andersen quotes tdward E p!>lem ·., B(•twccll Fact am/ Ftuum: Tire Prohlem of Joumalimr on the 
near-hve CO\erage of v 1etnam "l\etwork producers m control rooms m 'ev. York had neither the time nor the 
opportuni ty to shield American v1ewers from the gris ly close-ups of wounded Amencans, body bags, and death ." 
zx \ndersen, 49. 
'9 
• Andersen, 51-S5 
' n S1mon, "The Warm V1etnam, 1965-1961:1." After watching the broadcast and Cronkite's editorializing. President 
Johnson was quoted a'> S.l) mg "That's it. If I've lost Cronkite, I've lost middle \mcnca" 
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less well-known ent1ty who lacked pat1ence, did not aid the conflict's image either.31 Kennedy 
sent "mtlitary adv1sors" to assist the South Vietnamese, whtle Johnson signed for offic1al United 
States soldiers to be sent in, further alienating the American people from the \\ar and the White 
House.32 While Vietnam was uncensored, and graph1c, it was still limited in the amount of news 
that could be broadcast in a given day, as opposed to the next conflict. 
First Gulf \Var 
The First Persian Gulf War was fought on atr, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a 
week, on the Cable News etwork (CNN). The war made C N the leading "global" channel and 
"Operation Desert Storm changed the landscape of the American and international new media 
forever" because of this.33 To understand how CNN could so easily slip into this role of leading 
news network, the scholar must understand that CNN spent the better part of the late 1980s 
developing an "international newsgathenng and dissemination network. "34 This network was 
complete with barter-agreements and atellite hook-ups worldwide, as well as news bureaus in 
most major foreign countries. This gave CNN an advantage in Iraq that other networks were hard 
pressed to match. 35 While the nen.vork portrayed "both" sides of the issue, it I') intere tmg to note 
that they labeled the Iraqi propaganda as propaganda but ignored the fact that the images 
released by the U.S. military were also propaganda, promoting the image of a succe')sful and 
brief military campa1gn.36 CNN's forceful reporting on the "idea of lraq propaganda stood m 
ll Brewer, 186-187. 
12 Brewer, 188. 
''Andersen. 186 
·~ Andersen, 186. 
\S Andersen, 185 "The'>e practices gave CNN a presence in Iraq that is other ,\merican competitors could not match 
during Desert Stonn." 
36 Andersen. 157 Due to the censorsh1p and scarcity of battle images, the pub he sa\v only photos of bombmgs from 
the air. h1gh-tech v 1deos of smart bombs, graph1cs explaining the supenor technoiO)c!ICally ad\ anced weapons used 
by the Umted ·tates force'> ·\ lack of image' of wounded or dying military and c•vliian personnel. and no 1mages or 
10 
sharp contrast to the medta's silence about the arguably more effective U.S. Propaganda 
campatgn."P As part ofthe way Operation: Desert Storm was run, journalists were organized 
into "pools" and these pools were given different access to different important military figures, 
but saw little actual war (they were prohibited from taking photographs of the dead and 
wounded, and were not allowed to be near the front lmes), desptte this, the media dtd not raise 
many complaints. 3x Much of the media compltance is lmked to the use of"smart bombs" and 
flashy, high-tech weapons during the First Gulf War. While giving press briefings, the military 
and public relations personnel used videos showing the effectiveness of such weapons, and 
down played the loss of human lives by stressmg how many were saved by the use of these 
"smarter" weapons. As the public wants to sec success, rather than failure, journalists went along 
with the government's agcnda.39Thc "CNN effect" is generally considered to "portray the media 
as something that influences the policy process through its impact on public opinion.'.-~0 However 
recent studies have shown that the media is more than JUSt a public infonnant. 'The media 
should be seen as an integral part of contemporary governance ... it serves as a source of 
information for political actors and as an instrument ofmobilization.'.-~ 1 The First Gulf War 
showed the convergence of global media and how twenty-four hour coverage could be used to 
portray both sides from the angle of the U.S. Governmcnt.42 
destroyed homes or v11lages (m<,tead of destroyed mun1tions factones wh1ch were p1ctured etc . .. ) led people to 
beheve the .,., ar was gomg well 
Andersen. 186-187 Andersen details the emphasi., put on broadcasts from the Iraqi Tele' is ion "-.et\\ ork being 
comrolled by Saddam llussem's government. and subject to strict censor.,h1p. \Vhlle the photos and mformation 
released by the Umted States government about Desert Storm was sho\vn Without the same caveat to 11. 
lx Andersen. 155-158 
Andersen. ISS 
411 Noms. et al • 44 
41 Noms. et al., 45 
42 Andersen. 189 
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eptcmbcr ll , 2001: 
Wh!le September II, 2001, was not a \\ar, tt marked the tart of the next shift in frammg 
and led to the war in Afghanistan. The aftermath of the attack led to iconic tmages such as 
President George W. Bush standing astride the wreckage of the World Trade Center in front of 
the American flag, bull horn in hts hand as he shouts encouragement to the rescue workers.'u 
Staged tmages had evolved mto a powerful tool used by the gO\ernrnent to create public support 
and solidarity. The attacks also caused what is known as the " rally around the flag" effect.'H This 
effect is normally seen when a nation, state, or region has been attacked or suffered a crisis of 
some sort. With "rally around the flag" the members of a nation-state will demonstrate increased 
faith in, and dependence on, their leader. This in tum increases the sense of national identity and 
unity. The September II attacks were also subjected to an unprecedented amount of media 
coverage. Many Americans saw the second World Trade Center tower fall, and images from that 
day ha\e been repla}ed and reprinted countless times.4 ~ 
Iraq \Var: 
The second Iraq war, which began in 2003, utilized a techmque called "embedded 
journalism." This is where the reporters arc assigned to a unit of the military and travel 
everywhere wtth them. It is simi lar to Vietnam, but differs m that dunng the Vietnam conflict 
members of the press were not wanted and m Iraq, they \\ere as a means to show the rapid 
movement of U.S. and Coalition forces through the country.'~6 Embedded reporters' coverage, at 
Kellner, 28-29. 
14 Brewer, II 
15 Kellner, 28-1 S Kellner details the over-<.,aturatton of C)eplember It CO\erage, explaining that many \\ ho w ttne.,sed 
the fv, in Tov.ers fall on live tele\ t<.,ton sufkred ntghtmares and needed counseling fhe hype that surrounded the 
evenL., led to a surge of support for the Bush prestdency, and the .,ubsequcnt im aston of Afghanistan was in 
response to th1s dcme of the public for the Prestdent to do somethmg about the attacks. 
6 Le\\t<,. et at , ~4-~S 
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least m the early parts of the war, tended to focus on the lraq1 people's welcoming the Amcncan 
troops and the Amcncan and Coalttion personnel as " liberating forces" rather than the mvaders 
Saddam Hussein attempted to portray them as.'17 Studies ha\c shown that in the pre-war and 
early days of Operation: Iraqi Freedom the media, regardless of party-affiliated bias, tended to 
report pos1t1ve aspects of the war, and to report w1th a "group mentality" where all stories across 
networks followed Similar thcmes.411 Both Le\\iS (et al.) and Guardmo and Hayes point out that 
once embedded journalists had become casualties of war, the tone of the news began to shift in a 
less positive direction .49 In addition to this, media coverage portrayed the reasons for war by 
usmg mterv1cws w1th top U.S. offic1als, and used Iraqi or Middle-Eastern and French sources for 
the reasons against 1t. This meant that \\hilc the public was allowed to see opposmg VIewpoints 
on the issue, they saw the American side versus the rest of the world (another usc of the ever 
popular "us v. them" idea). It reinforced the frame of the United States as a liberator nation, as 
wel l as used the threat of terrorism (another frame) to mobili ze the American people m support 
of the war. 5° One of the best ways to view the war in Iraq through the frames and propaganda 
used is to look at press releases from the White House (under George W. Bush). 
Starting as far back as 2005, the press statements issued by the White I louse take the tone 
of "Setting the Record Straight." Th1s is a section of the press si te that lists point-by-pomt, 
article-by-article the problems the White I louse has with the media's reporting. When the White 
Hou. e was accused of falsifying documents on pre-war mtelligence, they issued a statement that 
listed six examples of The Washington Post's endorsement of this intelligence, deta iling hO\\ the 
4
• LC\\ IS, ct al .. 133. 
'Guardmo and llaycs, 24-26 . 
. ~ Guardmo and llaycs, 27-2X, Lcw1s ct al., 141. 
~0 Brcwcr.215-239, orris,ctal.l45- 147. 
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med1a's endorsement discredits the1r post-mvasion crit1c1sm.51 Another example is 
Representative Nancy Pelosi, before her promotiOn to Speaker of the House, downplaying the 
progress made in Iraq. The press release goes through her statement point by point and refutes 1t, 
arguing "progress has been made on all the issues Rep. Pelosi mentioned."52 Scott McClellan, 
Bush's Press Secretary from 2003 to 2006, called another Post article "simply reckless and 
irresponsible ... the lead in the article gave the impression for the reader that the president was 
saying something at the time that he knew to be untrue . . . " the Office of the Press Secretary used 
this quote in 1ts entirety to lead the release; which was full of point-by-point refutations. 53 The 
BC Network led a "Today" show w1th the mam story of"Crisis After Cris1s Has Undermined 
the Bush Doctrine" and found themselves the focus of a release the same day proving that Bush's 
policy approach was succeeding "The United States is rallying the world behind North Korea, 
behmd its pohcy toward Iran, its pohcy toward Iraq etc ... "54 In July of 2008 the White House 
issued a four page release that took key Iraq "myths" and refuted them with lists of facts, while 
this was not directed at any organization in part1cular, it is clear from the tone that they were 
attempting to persuade med1a outlets that the Republican White House, in an election year, had 
not failed the Amencan people as the Democrats were suggcstmg. 55 The tone of these releases 
implies that those who oppose the administration's views are incorrect, unpatnot1c, and wrong. 
Wh1lc some are more blatantly put than others, the general idea is clear if you do not ltke what 
the president said or did, be prepared to read a nasty release about yourself. 
There are t\vo more examples of the tone the Bush administratiOn took 1n the1r press 
releases. These di ffcr from the above 1llustrat1ons in two main \\ ays: I. they arc both authored by 
51 
"SRS The Washmgton Post on Pre-War .. : ·. 1-2. 
51 
"SRS Rep Pelosi ," I 
5 
"The Washmgton Post' s Recldess Reponmg On .. " , I. 
5 
· "SRS President Bush' s Fore1gn Policy " , 1-2 
ss "Iraq fact (heck . ", 1-4. 
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members of Bush's admm1stration but not directly by the Office of the Press Secretary, and 2. 
As a result of that, they are personal opinions from people whose vo1ces earned weight with the 
public. The first is a letter from Ed Gillespie. counselor to the president, to NBC ews Pres1dent 
Steve Capus. The letter accuses NBC of editing crucial pieces of an interview Bush gave with 
Richard Engel. It then offers the actual statements m1squoted by NBC and suggests m a not-so-
kind tone that NBC correct these errors or run the risk of havmg people think the commentator:, 
of MSNBC run NBC as well. 56 
The second and final press release to be looked at for th1s thes1s is a statement 1ssued by 
Stephen Hadley, national security adv1sor, referring to an ed1tonal article in the New York Tunes 
that bashed Bush, pre-war intelligence, and the war in Iraq in general. Hadley refutes the false 
information and suggests that the Times just does not want to acknowledge the progress made in 
Iraq for implied reasons of political affiliation, a bold and ugly statement for someone to make. 
However, it was acceptable as Hadley was not a White House employee, and was unaffiliated 
with the Press Office.57 
The information in the section is by no means a complete set of the broad history of war 
propaganda and framing from WWI to the present. It hopefully serves as a Cliffl'\otes version of 
the types and uses of propaganda in the United States from World War 1 to the present-day 
confl1ct in iraq. 
Starting w1th World War I the U.S. government actively tried to influence the public 
through all available forms of med1a, be this outright propaganda - in 1ts literal sense or by 
the usc of carefully selected news and media frames. As types of mass media emerged, they 
~6 "SRS · Pres1dent Bu<>h' s lnten1cw .. . ". 1-3. 
~· "Statement by 1\ auonal <;ccunty .. ". I . 
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contmued to expand their arsenal of opinion-altering rhetoric to better persuade the American 
people of the justness of"our cause" from conflict to contlict. 5x 
ln the current conflict the usc of med1a frames was more w1dely used than ever before, 
and the types of propaganda utilized were more varied (i.e. outright, embedded journalists, 
frames, press statements couched in specific terms ct cetera). Th1s shows the validity of 
Churchill's quote from the mtroduction: " In wartime, Truth is so precious that she must ah\ays 
be attended by a bodyguard of lies." In cases of war, the public docs not always need to know the 
truth, and even when the "truth" is given them, they should understand that 1t is never what tt 
seems. There will always be an altering of truth, because every person and! or government and 
med1a outlet w ill have a different view of wh1ch route the truth should take on its way to the 
masses. With truth being turned from black-and-white fact to shades of gray, it may not be 
poss1ble to ever know what the real story or situation IS. 
The next section of th1s paper\\ ill focus first on a study of media framing in the context 
of g lobal opinion of the United States post September I I, 200 I, in which perception and opinion 
were directly and indirectly shaped for entire regions by world newspapers. The study also looks 
at the issues involved w1th the use of the frame "terronsm. , sq 
Following that it will take a brief look at ways in which media are ab le to shape opinion 
based on what is not shown, which is not spec1fic to any one event, but rather a daily occurrence. 
Both examples will serve to illustrate how the slant of a media outlet may be m the words used, 
or in what is not used. They will also show that a slant may be liberal or conservat1ve, Western 
or Eastern, and may at times be just one per'ion ' s opinion, heard by many (Adolf Hitler, Soviet 
press, beat reporters, bloggers, etc ... ) in print, over the airv.;aves, or read via the World Wide 
sK Althaus, ct al. . 17. 
~ orns. ct al.. 164. 
16 
Web.60 Wtth the advance of modem technology has come an even greater ability for the truth to 
be slanted, and for the story to be altered. 
1>0 Pratkarm. ct al.. 26R-J26. 
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cction ll: Media influence in framing world opinion 
eptcmber 11, 2001 
Immediately following the events of September 11, 2001, the news media worldwide 
began to do its part in shaping the United States' (and other nation's) views on the terrorist 
attacks that destroyed the World Trade Center in New York C1ty. ln Framing Terronsm , Noms 
et at published an essay by Frank LoUis Ruscmno about the effects the elite Pres , or press \\<ith 
a widely-revered public, had on the framing of world opinion about the terrorist attack and the 
United States. World opinion is defined as " the moral judgments of observers which actors must 
heed m the mtemat1onal arena, or nsk isolat1on as a nation." 61 In Rusctano 's essa/2 the pohttcal 
scientist Samuel Huntington's theory of a "clash of civilizations" IS apphed to the press, and is 
used as a framework for viewing the "the changes in perceptions of world opinions over 
time ... how these perceptions change as world events change."63 lluntington stated in his 
argument that in the post-Cold War era, the maJOr\\ orld conflicts would occur between different 
civilizations, or groups of people based on ethnicity, religion, and culture. Huntington names 
seven major civilizations when formulating his argument: Western, Islamic, Sinic, Hindu, Latin 
American, African, and Slavic-Orthodox. ln his study, Rusciano contrasted Huntington's belief 
that world opinion was not possible, as the C1vtlizat1ons put themselves first, w1th "global 
op1mon theory" which argues that "nation advance interpretation of 'world opinion' whose 
structure and content are fa\orable to their mterests and values. "64 For each of l luntington 's 
ci\ 1 hzations, Rusciano selected a newspaper or newspapers with an audience largely comprised 
61 Norns. ct al.. 159 
rrammg World Opmion 111 the Due Preu pubh~hcd in Frammg Terronsm . 
"· Norns, ct a1 . 161 
~>~ Norns. ct al 159 
t8 
of the people for that group.65 All of the selected newspapers were pubhshed independently, w1th 
the except1on of the China Daily (Sinic) and the Arab Neus (lslam1c}, \\hich operate under 
government control. As the publications used by Rusciano arc influential, the shifts and changes 
that the seven week study recorded arguably both reflected, and aiTectcd world opinion. The 
analysis of the newspapers' coverage of the 9/ 11 attacks showed that all of the newspapers used 
the phrase "world opmion" explicitly, or Implicitly (m phrases such as "mternational opinion") 
For the seven weeks of his study, Rusciano found 287 references to'\\ orld opinion" on 
the attacks were printed in the ten newspapers. Of those, the International Herald Tribune had 
the most references to the phrase, followed (but not closely) by the Afncan paper.66 Of the 
sample set of papers, sixty-seven percent of the references were m ed1torials, and the remaining 
thirty-three percent of the references were in actual reports or stories. In addition to this, 
Ru~ciano found that the phrase "world opinion" was more likely to be referenced implicitly, 
rather than cxplicitly.67 Exphcit reference mcluded both the use of the phrase "world opm10n" 
and of comparable phrases such as "mternat10nal opmion," "international public opinion" and 
other like phrases. The implicit references "referred to some judgment or reaction being 
attnbuted to the world, such as ' \\Orldwide shock,' 'world outrage,' and a 'complete political and 
ideological 1solation of terronsts through internatiOnal cooperation. " 1611 
M 1\orns, et at .. 160 Rusciano selected The \'ew YorJ. T1mcs, The London Time~ and Israel's /Ia 'aret; Dllllv for 
Western Cl\ tluatton, The lrah \ cws for lslamtc, Times c~f /ndw for lltndu, Cl111w Dculr for Sm tc, the Argentinean 
paper Vac1on for Latm Amcnca. The Ntgcnan paper The Guardian for Afncan, and Pral'tlda for Sla' tc-Orthodo:<. 
To account for newspaper-. w tth an mtcrnational pcrspcctt\ c. he used The lnh matwtw/1/cra/d Trihunt• The 
analysts was done m Lnghsh, with translations made mto English where needed, though Vacum \Vas read in the 
original Spant.,h There arc three newspapers for the Western scctton as Rusctano beltcvcd 11 important to include an 
Amen can paper, a \\estern paper not published m the L . and the Israeli paper as the tssue was so rcle\'ant to the 
\-1tddlc [ ast 
M> 1\orns, et at., 16 1 fh e /ntemationa/1/em/d Tnhune had 72 references (25°'o ). the Guardum had 34 ( 12%), 
1/a 'arct= Dali_l' was tted with The Yea r'orJ. Tune\ for II%. Nacion had 9°o, Pramda and the lrah \ nn· tied at R%. 
Lone/on T1mcs came mat 7~o. and Clww Dailv tied \Vith Tune of lndw for 5°'o each 
t' 1\orn.,, ct at . 161 . The analysts showed thai 91% of the time, the reference was tmphctt. 
~~ 1\orns. ct at . 16 1. 
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Another facet to the arguments made with the study are that the 9/ II attacks caused 
people to stop and wonder what world opinion of the United States\\ as in general. Rusciano 's 
analyses of various polls and the amount of coverage of the toptc in hts newspaper samples 
showed some surprising results. For example, the analysis of the data showed the amount of 
"posttive evaluations of the nation [U.S.] outweighed the negative ones by a margin of twenty-
seven percent to nventy-three percent."69 However, the Israeli paper, Ha 'aret:::, the Arab Times. 
the Nigerian paper, Guardian, and the Russian paper Pra\·ada showed that negative evaluations 
of world opinion (of the United States) ounveighed the positive ones (this was the opposite for 
the other six newspapers). Upon further analysis, the results of the study show that although the 
Israeli paper and the Arab Times, agree that there is a greater negative evaluatiOn of the Umted 
States worldwide than a positive one, they did so for different reasons. The Israeli paper, 
according to Rusciano, was of the opinion that post-9/ II "the United States, hke Israel, 
understood how it felt to be under Stege and surrounded by a hostile world."70 The Saudi Arabian 
based Tunes indicated in their pages that they believed the attack on the United States was 
partially a result of the world's opinion toward Amencan Foreign Policy, notable toward Israel 
and Palestine.71 However, overall, the results of the study showed that the posthve opinion was 
in the lead until the \Veek of October 3, 200 I, after whtch positive opinion took the lead again, 
but at much lower levels, with no immediate mdications as to why.72 
While the study was thorough, Rusciano states that it was difficult to arrive at a truly 
international consensus, as world opinion is a -vague concept whtch vanes country to country. 
b'l Norns, et al., 162 . The remammg 50°'o of references were neutral. 
'I} Norns. et al.. 163. 
\lorns, et a1 . 163 
1\lorns, et al.. 164 Rusciano found that the Amencan and Bnt1sh bombings of Afghanistan began on October 7, 
and the "the Lnllcd State., intemationa11mage sh1fted from InJUred party to aggressor m certain fore1gn 
ne,•.:spapers." 
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The study ran into a similar problem when analyzing the opinions on the word "terrorism."73 The 
data showed that in the references to world opinion made by the newspapers, "terrorism" was 
regularly damned and condemned as an action, but the issue then became how to define 
"terrorism. "74 Rusciano discovered that as "terrorism is a method, rather than an ideology, a 
nation, or a leader; tt is a dtfficult subject for world opmion."75 To attempt to resolve this 
dtlemma, he broke the frame dO\\n into its components, usmg the interpretattons uttlt7ed by 
several international newspapers. The terminology that the data showed most common is 
comprised of a moral and pragmatic components (values shared by all nations combined with 
interests shared by all nations tied to world opinion), the power of world opiniOn (its mtluence 
on world events and the behavior of nations), a nation's image (reputation, as percei\ ed b} other 
nations and itself), the world considered as a unit (an international community which judges and 
responds to nations ' behav10rs), and the threat of international isolation (a punishment for 
nattons which depart from the prescriptions ofworld opinion). 76 The results ofRusctano's tests 
of the variables showed that the "judgments rendered regarding world opinion were more driven 
by the interests nattons were percetved to share."77 
After breakmg "terrorism" dO\\ n mto components, Rusctano reverts back to hts onginal 
plan, companng Huntington 's "clash of civiltzations" with the "global opinion theory." He 
'1\orns, ct al., 164. 
4 1\orns. ct al . 164. "Prob lems arose regarding ho\\ to define 'terrorism· beyond the horrible examples in Nc,v· 
York and Washmgton, D.C" 
· ~ Norns, ct al . 164. " one may 'know 11 \\hen they sec it,' but generating a genera l dcscnpuon for all or even 
most nat1ons to accept has proven elusl'.c If 'terrorism' can be defined to include unmtcnded civilian casualtic~ in a 
military campa1gn. for m-.tancc. along with the mtcnuonaltargetmg of c1vllian populatiOns. 11 becomes very difficult 
to reach and mtemat10nal consensus on the tenn's mcanmg or lcg1t1matc responses to 11." 
'II Norns ct al 164-165 'the moral component pro' 1des 'aluc-dnvcn JUStification for condcmnmg a g1ven nation or 
action, the pragmatic component contribute., to the powa of world opinion to innucncc C\enb, by convincmg 
nations that what IS moral1s also cons1stcnt w1th the common interest At stake for the subject country is the 11atw11 's 
image or 1ts reputation m '' orld opm10n Clll7cns tend to integrate the1r nation's intcmational1magc into the1r 
construction of national identity ... errant natiOns or leaders arc threatened, or puni<,hcd by, mtcmational isolatwn 
from the world community. or some other entity that defines the world as a unit." 
' ~orns. ct al . 165 Rusciano states that newspapers agreed that C\en without a moral agreement on what terrorism 
1s. the acts of September II, were a threat to the peace and sccunty of all nations. 
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found significant statistical evidence to support that the timing of references to "world opinion" 
between the newspapers for the Western publications and the rest of the sample set papers was 
very close together. llowever, there was a slight difference in the amount of references between 
the Mushm newspaper and the Western newspapers, and between the Muslim newspaper and the 
rest of the civthzations newspapers. According to the results, when "the dates of references on a 
gtven issue converge among two or more medta outlets, there ts an apparent consensus on the 
agenda for world opinion in those media. When the dates of reference to world opinion diverge, 
it suggests an apparent disagreement on the agenda for world opinion."7x Rusciano uses this 
pattern to suggest that Huntington's argument is less valid than global opmion theory."9 
In a highly technical factor analysis of still more newspaper articles the reactions to the 
Tal iban bombing in Afghanistan were used to extrapolate what each region's perception of 
terrorism is. The perception shown from the data for the Western civilization was "a region 
whose perception of v. orld opinion requires them to hnk thetr very identities and images to the 
international community's condemnation of their definition of terrorism, and support for the 
acttons they deem necessary to combat it."110 In contrast, the analysts for the Arab News showed 
that they percetved the dangers of a "Western scramble for mternational status ... the Arab Nev.·s 
recognized the moral tssue of terrorism, but [were] generally suspicious of the methods that 
might be used to combat it. "x1 The other civilizations fell between Western and Jslamtc on their 
vtews of world opimon and saw it as holding power over the interests it defines for other nations, 
and the importance of taking a moral stand against terrorism for their own images. However, 
·'\orris. et al. 166-167 
9 
orns. eta! . 167 " If the clash of civilizattons theory \Vere correct. one would expect percept tons of the agenda to 
dtffer for the \\est and the Mushm newspaper'>. however, one would not e>,.pect the rest of the newspapers to 
correspond wnh the Western perception of this agenda" 
1\oms. et al.. 172 
· l·l 1\iorns. e t al .. 172-173. The \r1uslim ci" ilization was also di\'ergent from that of the United <.,tates \\estern 
Cl\tluallon in that defining "terronsm" \er-.us "lcgttimatc jthad" was problematic at t11nc~. 
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they were also fearful that go ing against the United States' wishes regarding terrorism would 
lead to putting their own nat1onal1mages at ri sk.t<:? 
The conclus1on ofthc Rusciano study \\aS that wh1le opinions vary from civiltntion to 
civi lization, global opinion 1s an "ongoing process that potentially affects international images, 
and shifts it in response to \\Orld cvcnts."113 However, this docs not, in h1s op1nton, ind1catc an 
ongomg "clash of c1viltzatton . " World opmion IS stronger than the potential threat of a "clash" 
for Rusciano, and th1s counters Huntington's argument. Moreover, he argues that it is more 
important for the world to reach a consensus on a definition for "terronsm" than to worry about 
Huntington's theory. "A clear definition of terrorism must precede its condemnation, and such a 
definition has not yet been reached .... even the general condemnation of terrorism is directed 
against a method, not a nation, leader, or some other actor on the international stage. ''1q The 
many interpretations of "world opinion" and "terrorism" that were broken down and analyzed, 
and the differences m their perception from civilizatton to civilization tllustratcs the danger of 
framing. If nations cannot agree on definitions for words such as the e, misunderstandings arc 
bound to happen as entire groups of people believe dtfferent definitions of the same word. 
Perception by angle or oversight 
£:.very day, around the world, there arc millions of news stories happenmg, regardless of 
whether or not they receive attention from any form of media. From wars and riots, to spelltng 
bees, credit card theft, political speeches and everything in between, life happens hour after hour 
and minute after minute and the news media cannot possibly hope to cover it all. So how do they 
~· f\orns. et al., 173-174. 
~ '\orns. et al.. 175. 
x~ Norns. et al.. 176 . " fhe trag1c event'> of September II. 200 I , and the subsequent continuation of terror as a 
weapon. suggest'> that rc'>oh mg the underlymg problem of definition demands the full attention of the world opinion 
and the mtcmational community." 
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pick and choose? f:.st1mates show that for a typical daily newspaper, more than seventy-five 
percent of the potential news 1tems never see pnnt.85 In the case of network television news, and 
nat10nal broadcast and print media, the reJected number is even higher.s6 There are multiple 
armed conflicts occurring in the world today, but the reader of a daily paper, or viewer of a local 
news broadcast, may hear about two to three of them.11 ... Even then, most people will probably not 
remember much about the confl1cts chosen, unless the story comes w1th an image that 1s 
unforgettable, or a human interest line that hits home. For example: Ferdinand Marcos. The 
average person probably has no idea that Ferdinand Marcos was president (dictator) of the 
Philtppmes for many years. However, if a random person is asked 1fthey have heard of Imelda 
Marcos' shoe , the odds of receiving an affinnative respon e increase significantly. Imelda 
Marcos, Ferdinand's wife, had thousands of pairs of shoes, representing virtually every color, 
style, and type. An image of her shoe closet accompanied an ABC News broadcast about 
Marcos' corruption toward the end of his tenure as leader. The image of all those shoes stuck 
with many people as it was a simple, but vivid and tangible example of the corruption of the 
upper echelons of the Philtppine government. 11M This selectivity in news coverage is often 
considered the tart of propaganda. Walter Lippmann believed this theory, and once said: 
Without some fonn of censorship, propaganda ... I impossible. In order to conduct 
a propaganda there must be some barrier between the public and the event. Access 
to the real environment must be limited, before anyone can create a pseudo-
environment that he thinks wise or des1rable. For while people who have direct 
access can misconceive 1t, unless he can decide where they shall look, and at 
what.x11 
~~ Pratkanis et al 268 
'
1 Pratkants, et al., 268. Pratkant'> "ays that charactensttcally, the ne'' s that is reported on contains vivid tmages, 
whtch ts ''hat people prefer, rather than useful , accurate mfom1atton 
· By the same tol\en, there arc more baste every day stone~ huch as school '>porting events. church Passion plays, 
or car theft m a shopping mall parl\ing lot)'' hich "til not recct\e coverage at all. 
Pratkanis, ct al , 268 
• Pratkanis, et al , 269 
Hitler and the Nazi Party understood this concept, and early on in their rise to the top in 
Germany, they established a publishing company, Ehler Verlag. Hitler's message of hatred was 
designed to persuade an entire country to side with him.90 And it worked. At the height ofNazi 
popularity, this company controlled more than one hundred fifty publishing houses, made a 
profit of more than one million marks per year , and employed an estimated thirty-five thousand 
people. Hitler also kept the press at bay by rewarding journalists he liked with spec ial interviews, 
favors , and promotions, and by punishing those who disagreed with his policy (they were 
investigated by the government, limited in their access to news, and often had their operating 
licenses revoked or suspended).91 
Long before their take-over of Russia in the Bolshevik October revolution of 1917, the 
Communist (Bolshevik) Party created the newspaper Pravda, to spread " news." The name, 
ironically enough, means "truth," and the more than seven-decade existence of Pravda censored 
and controlled the news distributed to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. 92 State-run press, 
however open it may claim to be, is going to be slanted in a pro-administration direction as it is 
funded and controlled by the government. 
However, not all slant is determined by what is not covered, or by whether or not the 
government runs the presses. Media may find biases creeping in with the average news reporter, 
especially if they work a beat.93 A beat instantly adds a source of bias to the news, whereas 
something that happens between beats or otT beat altogether has a much lower chance of being 
covered, unless it is a natural disaster, or rare and unique event. Roughly sixty percent of the 
'Xl ln Persuasion in Sociely, Simons, et al., define "persuasion" as "human communication designed to innuence the 
autonomous judgments and actions of others." 
~ 1 Pratkanis, et al., 269. "Any revolu tionary or would-be leader worth his or her salt knows that a primary objective 
is to secure the public's source of news." 
n Pratkanis, et a l. , 270. 
qJ Pratkanis, eta!., 27 l . A beat is a "group of intuitions to cover such as the local cnminal justice system or the 
White 1 louse or Hollywood or sports teams." 
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stories appearing The New York Times and The Washington Post are from routine beats and 
assignments. 94 This means that readers can expect the same types of stories day after day. There 
will be stories about movie stars' affairs in the Hollywood section and there will be articles 
detailing the suspected steroid use of a baseball player in the sports section. This pattern of 
repeat story coverage holds true for other categories of beat-reported news as well. Off-beat 
stories are rarely covered, and even then are often not considered news.95 
Reporters do not intend to be biased, rather it stems from being on deadline, expected to 
produce a set amount of copy by a set time on specific days. To accomplish this goal, reporters 
often prioritize and place a premium on good, trusted sources that can be counted on for an 
insider view or accurate, speedy responses. While helpful , this creates a media bias in two (and 
potentially more) ways. First, a reporter develops a routine for how they cover their stories (often 
ignoring other groups who may have insight on a particular article merely because if they report 
on a subject such as crime, they will contact police and the district attorney, but overlook welfare 
because it is not a common thought). The second accidental creation of bias in the beat is that 
this routine often ensures that the same type of people will be featured in the news.96 
Another issue which has inadvertently created bias or slant in the media, especially in 
print, is the growing trend for newspapers to be owned by corporations. In 2001 there were 
twenty-three corporations which owned most of the television, magazines, books, and movies in 
the United States. Some sixty percent of local, daily newspapers belonged in part, or completely, 
to one of fourteen corporate chains. There were three companies essentially in charge of the 
magazine industry, six record labels controlled eighty percent of the music production, and 
q~ Pratkanis, ct at., 27 1. 
q5 Pratkanis, ct al, 271. 
w. Pratkanis, ct at.. 272. 
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seventy percent of the primetime Network TV shows were created by nine film companies. 97 The 
concentration of ownership results in pressure on reporters to cover or not cover certain stories, 
and to avoid making the parent corporation look bad. 
Lastly, journalists, both print and broadcast, have jobs only as long as they can keep the 
attention of the public, so the stories they research and print (or broadcast) must be what the 
public wants (to sell papers and attract ratings and advertising). Studies have shown that when 
most people watch the news " most viewers want to be amused and diverted; being informed is 
only a secondary motive for watching."911 In order to hit higher ratings, and generate more 
revenue "the mass media content tends to be agreeable and to require little effort on the part of 
the consumers, while still being arousing, emotionally engaging, and above all entertaining."99 
There are, of course, other theories relating to media content and bias, however for the 
purposes of thi s thesis, these serve to illustrate several of the methods involved in shaping of 
perception of the news. At times the slant is purposed and other times it is an accidental 
consequence of the direction the industry has taken. Regardless of the method and intent, the 
truth, shaped by the government in many cases first, is further altered when it reaches the press, 
and by the time it reaches the general public, it is often difficult to determine what the original 
story really was. 
97 Pratkanis, ct at., 273 . 
<~x Pratkams, et at. , 273 . 
<1'1 Pratkan1s, et at., 273. 
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This paper began with the idea that in today's world truth is not absolute. That for any 
given situation, the truth of the matter has been altered, whether by the government or the mass 
media, and in most cases, people have no idea what they are accepting as fact is actually semi-
fiction. The methods used to twist and sh ift the truth are not so much about blatant 
propaganda, 100 but about framing and its ability to change not necessarily the truth itself, but our 
viewpoint of it, without our consciously knowing that that is what has been donc.101 The 
definition of a " frame" was defined and refined throughout these pages, but essentially a frame's 
function is "bundling key concepts, stock phrases, and iconic images to reinforce certain 
common ways of interpreting developments."102Propaganda is usually thought of as a wartime 
phenomenon, used in situations where the line between ethical and unethical is often blurred, but 
in today 's global climate of conflict, is seems that that line merely remains blurred, and that 
propaganda is then the rule of the day rather than the exception to the rule. 
The birth of modern day war propaganda was World War I, in which the government 
used techniques that kept up American morale for a prolonged period of time based on hatred, 
fear, and imagination. They were able to do thi s in part because with the advent of the telegraph 
and newspapers achieving popularity, information could be quickly disseminated.103 The 
Committee of Public Information, created by Wilson and run by media mogul George Creel, tied 
media frames into propaganda. The information released by the Creel Committee, as it came to 
be called, focused Americans on the "new world" versus "old world" idea, and the "us versus 
100 
"propaganda, n." 3'd dcfimtton. OED Online. '\lovember 2010. Oxford IJmvcrsity Press. 
101 Norris, ct al., 4, 6. " ... the idea of news frames, representing persistent patterns of selection, emphasis, and 
exclusion that furnish a coherent interpretation and evaluation of events." Norris continues the explanation on pg. 6, 
"[this] conceptualization is intimately linked with theory, there can be no single 'correct' definition; instead 
concepts should be assessed in tcnns of the fruitfulness of the theoretical ins1ghts that now from the understand mg." 
102 Norris , et al., I 0-11 . This definition is expanded to include: "The essence of framing is selection to prioritize 
some facts, images, or developments over others, thereby conscious or unconsciously promoting one particular 
interpretatiOn of events." 
103 Anderson explore~ this tdea. and others in her book A Cenlury of .lfedia, A Centwy of JVar. 
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them" idea to maintain unity and common ground. A study by professors at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign showed that World War I used more inclusive language, such as 
" us versus them" than in any war before or after it, though Iraq used the same amount, but in 
different ways. 104 
In World War li the tactics evolved to include the politics of fear. lfthe Allies did not 
win, a terrible thing would befall the world and the American way of life would end. 105 The 
Creel Committee was replaced by the Office of War Information (OWl) which promised 
accurate information, as opposed to the propaganda used in World War I. While the information 
released by OWl was newsy in tone, it was definitely slanted in a White House approved and 
endorsed direction.106 
The difference in reporting from Korea, the forgotten war, to Vietnam is stark because 
during Korea the press was given access to top U.S. officials, and people could see the president 
or whomever speaking to them. However, the censorship of the press actually in Korea during 
the war was very strict. News outlets had to have all copy run through General MacArthur' s 
office. 107 Whereas in Vietnam, the fighting was happening so quickly that journalists were able 
to see it up close and personal, and there was no censorship of what the media could report. lt 
scared, appalled, and shocked the American public and gave rise to a growing distrust of the 
United States government. 108 
With the advent of CNN and 24/7 news, the Persian Gulf War was an example of the 
government attempting to correct for Vietnam's mistakes, while sti ll shaping coverage of the 
situation. They did this by allowing networks to use military photos and graphics, and networks 
I ().I Althaus, et al., 16-17. 
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such as CNN gave largely one-sided interviews about the issues.109 
On September ll, 2001, media took center stage and beat the government to the frame, 
speaking out against radical Islamists and the terrorist attacks. The government quickly got onto 
the bandwagon, with terms such as "axis of evil," "war on terrorism," and others. 110 
The second Iraq war, also known as the War in Iraq, is still underway, though for the 
purposes of research, the information used in this thesis comes from the White House of George 
W. Bush. In the Press Office response to Iraq, it is possible to see that the government has 
adapted its old strategies of "us v. them"111 and "right v. wrong," but are now proclaiming this by 
refuting the quoted works of others, and by explaining that the United States is committed to 
protecting the rights of human beings across the world, a stance which has not been widely 
popular. They also used embedded reporters to show the speed with which U.S. troops took 
Baghdad, and framing in the way they referred to members of the coalition troops as "liberating 
forces" and even the name of the attack, Operation: Iraqi Freedom, attempt to skew public 
opinion.112 The claims made by the Bush administration that there were weapons of mass 
destruction (WMDs) in Iraq- the justification offered for the war, were ultimately based on 
faulty intelligence. However, even after this fact had come to light, the administration was able 
to spin the conversation away from their failure to act on accurate information, and instead focus 
on the fact that Saddam Hussein was responsible for funding terrorists and violating the basic 
human rights of his citizens. While the Iraq War lost popularity, the fact that the government had 
sold half-truths to the public about the reasons it went to war, and got away with it, was 
underreported and ignored by many. This goes to show that the frames of a "global war on 
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terrorism" and a "campaign for democracy" were more successful at sticking in the minds of the 
American media and public than the ugly truth of the situation. 
On the media side, September ll , 200 I, offered a chance to attempt to measure world 
opinion and the way different newspapers seek to define both that, and the concept of 
"terrorism."113 By cross-applying Huntington's "clash of civilizations" model to the newspapers 
selected for the sample, Rusciano was able to compare the accuracy ofHuntington's theory 
against the alternative theory that there is an evolving "globe world opinion" instead. The results 
of his study did not definitively disprove Huntington, but did show more solidarity between 
certain civilizations than had been expected. While the world may be grouped into the seven 
distinct civilizations that Huntington posited, there is enough evidence, in newspapers at least, to 
support the idea that they are all concerned with the world opinion. 114 
Several theories of the media's use of persuasion were considered, from government's 
intentional control of the press and its message to persuade the population, 11 5 to the accidental 
creation of bias in both print and broadcast journalism by journalists caught in an environment 
where corporatization has tied their hands on many issues, and the pressure to cough up similar 
stories day after day has increased the likelihood of them forming patterns of reporting which 
leave out entire sections of potentially valuable sources116. 
The last of those theories briefly looked at the idea that people do not want to be 
informed, but rather wish to be entertained. 117 This idea, if true, means that despite the 
propaganda, infoganda, and framing, people are essentially asking to be blinded to the true 
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realities of the world, at least in the United States. 118 With a culture increasingly less interested in 
being informed and more interested in being entertained, does it even matter to people that truth 
has become irrelevant? Perhaps more importantly, in a country defined by consumerism, with 
easy-access to the Internet, cable and satellite TV, and sites like Twitter and Facebook, is it 
possible that Americans are now stuck in a cycle of entertainment news over truth. 
If a person wishes to only hear one side of an issue, it is all too easy for them to 
completely avoid the other viewpoint. With sites like Google offering personalized pages to its 
users, Americans can filter the information they receive, effectively censoring themselves and 
keeping anything they disagree with from ever crossing their path. If Americans are so willing to 
"frame" their own news, is it really the fault of the government and the media that they are 
misinformed? 
If people do not even know that there is a crisis in another country, because they care 
more about Justin Bieber's haircut than the situation in Japan for example, they cannot be 
expected to become involved in relief efforts. If there is no coverage of human rights violations, 
no one will cry foul to the United Nations, when a heat wave in Russia makes a newspaper 
edition because it is accompanied by a photo of a Russian woman smoking in a bikini, instead of 
a story about the mudslides in Pakistan. Is it really such a surprise that Americans are considered 
lazy and poorly-informed by other countries? 
The American people have got to realize that this steady diet of entertainment and soft 
news is contributing to their lack of good information, and that in this climate of global conflicts, 
truth is already compromised and needs all the help it can get to peek through the layers of 
creative packaging it is wrapped in. Perhaps when they reach this stage, Winston Churchill will 
be proven wrong, and the truth can stand without her "bodyguard oflies." 
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